Security Apps under the Looking Glass: An Empirical Analysis of Android
  Security Apps by Yao, Weixian et al.
Security Apps under the Looking Glass:
An Empirical Analysis of Android Security Apps
Weixian Yao,∗ Yexuan Li,∗ Weiye Lin,∗ Tianhui Hu,∗ Imran Chowdhury,∗ Rahat Masood,∗† Suranga Seneviratne∗
∗ University of Sydney, Australia, † Data61-CSIRO,
Email: {first name.last name}@sydney.edu.au
This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be
accessible
Abstract—Third-party security apps are an integral part of
the Android app ecosystem. Many users install them as an extra
layer of protection for their devices. There are hundreds of such
security apps, both free and paid in Google Play Store and
some of them are downloaded millions of times. By installing
security apps, the smartphone users place a significant amount
of trust towards the security companies who developed these
apps, because a fully functional mobile security app requires
access to many smartphone resources such as the storage, text
messages and email, browser history, and information about
other installed applications. Often these resources contain highly
sensitive personal information. As such, it is essential to under-
stand the mobile security apps ecosystem to assess whether is it
indeed beneficial to install them. To this end, in this paper, we
present the first empirical study of Android security apps. We
analyse 100 Android security apps from multiple aspects such
as metadata, static analysis, and dynamic analysis and presents
insights to their operations and behaviours. Our results show
that 20% of the security apps we studied potentially resell the
data they collect from smartphones to third parties; in some
cases, even without the user consent. Also, our experiments show
that around 50% of the security apps fail to identify malware
installed on a smartphone.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones have become an essential element in our daily
lives. As the end of 2019, the number of global smartphone
users was predicted to reach 3.2 billion, which is a staggering
41% of the global population [44][43]. Due to the wide range
of apps people use in their smartphones, smartphones have
become a storage for highly sensitive personal data such as
communications, images and videos, health information, and
financial details. Also, many enterprises rely on smartphones
for their business operations and in some cases even allow their
employees to use their own devices for business work. Thus,
smartphones have become lucrative targets for cyber attacks
and it is of utmost important to keep smartphones secure.
Analogous to antivirus software for computers, mobile secu-
rity apps are available for smartphones. Many of these mobile
security apps are downloaded millions of times and many
enterprises usually installs third party security apps or mobile
device management software in company-issued phones as an
extra layer of security [51]. While indicating that if the users
stick to the official app stores and stay up-to-date with the
operating system updates, they don’t need any mobile security
software in their smartphones [41], both Apple and Google still
allow third party security apps in their app stores. Whether the
users need to install third-party mobile security apps in their
smartphones is a contentious topic.
In multiple occasions some of mobile security apps have
been reported for dubious activities such as intentional or
unintentional personal information collection, advertisement
fraud, or simply providing a false sense of security without
actually detecting mobile malware [4][50]. The correct oper-
ation of a functional third-party-mobile security app requires
a significant access to user data and mobile phone resources
(i.e. in the from of permission requests). For example, a mobile
malware detection app will require access to all the stored files
to ensure that no malware is transferred to the device [3][2].
Similarly, a mobile internet security app will require access
to all the URLs a user visits in order to prevent the user
visiting a malicious website [7]. As a result, a smartphone
user who is thinking of installing a mobile security app needs
to make an informed decision whether it is beneficial to install
such an app or simply stick to the security measures provided
by the platform provider, i.e. majorly Google and Apple. To
this end, in this paper we study the functionalities and inner
workings of a set Android mobile security apps using metadata
analysis, static code analysis, and dynamic behaviour analysis.
Specifically, we make the following contributions.
• We conduct a keyword search in Google Play Store
and identify 328 Android security apps. We conduct an
analysis of their metadata to understand the security app
ecosystem. We show that despite increasing the security
measures in the Android operating system, the number
of security apps in the Google Play store is steadily
increasing and they are frequently used by the end users.
We find that 26 out of 328 apps were downloaded over
10M times and 37 apps were downloaded over 1M times.
• We examine the privacy policies of 100 selected security
apps and found that 55 of them may decide to share
the data they collect with legal authorities or business
affiliates. We also found that 20% resell the data to third
parties, in some cases without user permission. Nearly,
70% of apps collect sensitive user information such as
installed apps and device information.
• Using static analysis we found that on average a se-
curity app requests approximately 22 permissions that
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include approximately four dangerous permissions. We
observed that WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE, READ
EXTERNAL STORAGE, and READ PHONE STATE are
the most frequently requested dangerous permissions.
While these permission requests are essential for the cor-
rect functionality of the security app, they can as well be
easily abused. At wrong hands, such level of information
access together with the privacy consent users give during
installation can have serious consequences.
• We measure the effectiveness of the security apps in mal-
ware detection by copying and installing known malware
samples into a test phone and checking whether security
apps can detect them. We found that an alarming number
of the apps fail to detect the presence of a malware. For
example, only ∼20% of the apps were able to detect
malware copies stored in a phone, and only ∼50% of the
apps were able to detect malware installed in a phone.
Also, we note that another significant fraction of security
apps were not having up to date virus databases and as
such fail to identify recent malware samples.
• Finally, we analyse the network traffic generated by
the security apps, and show that while majority of the
traffic going out are encrypted, still there is unencrypted
communication using port 80. We also analysed the type
of information security apps sent to their remote servers
and found that device model, root build ID, and brand are
the most frequently sent out information. Moreover, we
also found evidence of sensitive personal information in
the likes of installed apps and persistent identifiers (e.g.
Android ID and BSSID) is being collected.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II
we describe related work and in Section III we describe
our data collection methodology and present a basic char-
acterization of the security apps. Privacy policy analysis and
permission analysis are presented in Section IV and Section V
respectively while Section VII delves into the network traffic
generated by security apps. We discuss the implications of our
findings, limitations, and concluding remarks in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a plethora of work studying characteristics and
behaviours of mobile apps. We present related work under
three topics; i) mobile malware, over-permissions and other
dubious behaviours detection, ii) behaviour characterization
of one specific group of apps, and iii) empirical studies of
antivirus apps.
A. Mobile malware, over-permissions, & dubious behaviors
When it comes to mobiles apps, malware detection is a topic
that has been studied extensively [56], [11], [52], [35], [24],
[46]. Early work by Zhou and Jian [56] was the first to study
Android malware samples in the wild. Authors characterised
over 1,000 malware samples belonging to 49 malware families,
evolved during the early years of Android. Also, authors tested
the detection rates of four mobile malware detection software
and showed that in best cases 79.6% samples were detected
and in the worst case only 20.2% samples were detected.
Multiple subsequent work proposed methods to detect mobile
malware. Such methods include static analysis [57], [15],
dynamic analysis [53], [6], and hybrid methods [30], [42].
Tam et al. [49] and Faruki et al. [8] present comprehensive
surveys of Android malware analysis techniques.
In contrast to mobile malware, apps requesting over-
permissions do not pose a direct threat to the data stored in
the phone or the device itself. Rather, these apps have more
access to phone resources and data than what is required
for the functionality of the app. Such additional access is
usually used for advertising and analytics purposes and can
be a threat to user privacy. Such access also allows possible
future malicious activities. Grace et al. [12] and Leandros
et al. [21] characterised the over-permission behaviours of
top Android apps. Gorla et al. [10] clustered apps based on
app descriptions and identified typical API usages for various
app functionalities. Then the authors used anomaly detection
to identify apps requesting unnecessary permissions. Other
comparable work includes [27], [54], [26].
Another body of work focused on detecting various other
malpractices in mobile app markets such as spamming [37],
[38], counterfeiting [29], and ranking fraud [48], [58]. These
apps adversely affect the overall health of the Android app
ecosystem and in some cases were also reported to contain
malware. Majority of the detection methods proposed use var-
ious features generated from app metadata like app description,
developer information, ratings, and app icons in combination
with machine learning models. In contrast to these works, our
work specifically focus on the mobile security apps and study
their operations and behaviours.
B. Behaviour characterization of specific app groups
Several studies focused on specific functional groups of
apps, especially from the privacy and security viewpoint.
Meyer [25] et al. characterised the advertising behaviours of
135 apps targeting children under the age of five and showed
that manipulative and deceptive behaviours are commonplace.
Reyes et al. [33] conducted automated analysis of 5,855 most
popular free children’s apps and found that the majority of the
apps are in fact in violation of the Childrens Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA). For example, 19% of the apps were
found collecting personally identifiable information (PII) and
66% of the apps were still collecting the persistent device
identifiers than the re-settable advertising identifiers. Similar
studies has been conducted for health apps [22], [5]. More
recently, He et al. [14] studied the behaviours of various
dubious apps that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic
containing related keywords.
Ikram et al. [18][17] studied the privacy and security aspects
of VPN apps and ad-blocking apps that are heavily used by
privacy conscious smartphone users and the results were eye-
opening. For instance, authors found that 18% of the VPN
apps actually do not encrypt the traffic providing a false sense
of confidentiality, and 4% of the apps contained malware.
Similarly, Seneviratne et al. [36] and Hu et al. [16] showed that
paid apps can also pose serious privacy and security threats
to the users, despite the common belief that such problems
predominantly occur in free apps. Our work is complementary
to these studies. We provide an empirical analysis of a security
apps; an app group that hasn’t received wider attention despite
its high importance.
C. Empirical studies of antivirus apps
Limited work studied of antivirus software in the context
of desktop computers and laptops [45], [47], [28]. Rajab et
al. [28] measured 15% of the all malware detected in the
web were advertised as free antivirus software by analysing
over 200 million malicious web pages. Stone-Gross et al. [45]
delved into the economics of the scare-ware and fake antivirus
market and showed that the organized underground business of
fake antivirus software easily reaches the scale of hundreds of
millions of dollars. Finally, Sukwong et al. [47] evaluated the
effectiveness of the commercial antivirus software and found
that they could not identify all the modern threats.
Our work is comparable to the industrial report [9] and the
studies by Rastogi et al. [31] and Zheng et al. [55]. However,
these studies solely focus on the effectiveness of the Android
security software, whereas our study is multi-faceted. We not
only study the effectiveness of the security software, but also
investigate various other privacy and security threats they can
pose.
III. DATA SET AND BASIC CHARACTERISTICS
In this section, we describe our data collection and pre-
processing steps. We also, provide a basic characterisation of
security app metadata.
A. Data collection
We first conducted a keyword search in Google Play store
with security related terms such as “antivirus”, “malware”,
and “security” and identified 328 potential Android security
apps. Next, we crawled the Play Store pages of these apps and
downloaded the executable file (APK). We also recorded the
metadata such as the app description, number of downloads,
ratings, and developer information.
Since some of the analysis we subsequently conduct re-
quires manual effort, we next select a representative sample
of 100 apps out of the 328 apps we downloaded. First, we
ranked the apps based on the number of downloads, number of
user reviews, and rating, similar to what was done in previous
work [37], [38]. Next, we divided 328 apps into three groups
of 100, 100, and 128 apps, respectively. From the first group,
we selected top-40 apps, and that included well known security
apps such as McAfee and Kaspersky. We randomly selected
30 apps each from the other two groups. This selection gives
us a sample of 100 apps that contains highly popular security
apps as well as apps that are not so well known.
B. Metadata Analysis
Timeline of Security Apps: To identify the trends in security
app availability, we extracted the creation time from
the metadata of each app. Figure 1 shows the development
timeline of 328 antivirus apps as well as 100 apps that
we selected. We notice a steady increase in the number of
antivirus since 2010, and a steep increase since 2015. Overall,
it indicates that there is an increasing demand for security apps
attracting more developers.
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Fig. 1: Timeline of security apps in Google Play Store
Geographical Location: We next analyse the geographical
location of antivirus apps as illustrated in Figure 2. According
to the figure, most of these apps are operating from the United
States, Europe, China, and India. However there are some
notable outliers. For example, well known Kaspersky security
app is the one marked in Russia. One listed under New Zealand
is “Emsisoft Mobile Security” - a security app that provides
services such as malware scanning, anti-theft, privacy advisor,
and web security. Similarly, apps in Indonesia and Philippines
include Hackuna - Anti-Hack (a WiFi security app) and Search
Phone Security - Booster & Cleaner,1 respectively.
Fig. 2: Geo-locations of the security apps
Popularity of Antivirus Apps: Figure 3 shows the download
distribution the security apps. One app “Clean Master” was
downloaded over one billion times. It is a multi-purpose
security app providing variety of services such as app lock,
battery saver, junk file cleaning, virus detection, and Android
optimization. Nonetheless, this app was recently removed from
Google Play Store under the suspicion that it is involved in an
1This app is no longer available in Google Play Store
advertisement fraud scheme [34]. This indeed is a compelling
incident to highlight how easily security apps can abuse the
trust placed by their users.
“Device Care” by Samsung that provides device mainte-
nance services for Samsung mobile devices was downloaded
over 500 million times. The app analyses battery usage on
a per-app basis and identifies battery draining apps. It also
offers features such as power saving mode, remove unneces-
sary files, RAM management, malware detection, and device
configuration. Potentially this app might be pre-installed in
some Samsung devices, which can be a reason behind the
higher number of downloads. Another app that had over 500
million downloads is “CM (Cleanmaster)”. This app was also
from the same developer as the previous “Clean Master” app
and was recently banned from Google Play Store. Finally, we
note that there are no selected apps in the download range
from one million to ten million because after the ranking we
did (cf. Section III-A), from the first 100 apps we selected
only the top-40 apps whereas from the other two groups we
selected apps randomly.
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Fig. 3: Download distribution of the security apps
Number of Downloads vs. Ratings: We next analyse the
distribution of ratings (ranging from 0 to 5) against the number
of downloads. As shown in Figure 4, the vast majority of the
security apps have a very high rating (over 4), indicating they
are well received by the end users. For example, all the apps
with over 10 million downloads had a rating higher than 4.4.
The banned “Clean Master” app had an average rating of 4.6.
C. App description mining
Though all the apps we selected broadly fit into the category
of Android security, they have different security functionalities
such as “internet security”, “malware scanning”, or “virus
removal”. To understand what types of services and func-
tionalities the security apps provide, we next mine the app
descriptions of the 100 apps we selected. Our approach is to
use the doc2vec model [20] to obtain vector representations
of app descriptions and cluster them using k-means clustering
to identify functional groups.
doc2vec model - Since a large text corpus is required to
train the doc2vec model, we start with 25,000 random app
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Fig. 4: Rating distribution against the number of downloads
descriptions we downloaded from Google Play Store as a part
of our previous work [29]. We pre-process the app descriptions
with standard natural language processing techniques such as
removing symbols, non-English characters, stop word removal,
and stemming. Next, we train a doc2vec model using the
resulting corpus that produces a vector representation of size
100 for a given text.
(a) Cluster 1 (b) Cluster 2
Fig. 5: Main themes of Android security apps
k-means clustering - We used k-means clustering to cluster
the 100 selected apps based on the vector representations
produced by doc2vec. We identified the optimal number of
clusters based on the silhouette score, which is a standard
metric used to measure the quality of clustering. The range
of silhouette coefficient is [-1,1]. A higher value of silhouette
score implies that there is high similarity between the elements
of individual clusters and the clusters are well separated.
We calculate silhouette score for different k values ranging
from 2 to 10. The highest value of silhouette score resulted
when k was two. According to this clustering, Cluster-1
contained 65 apps whose major focus is on providing virus
scanning functions and included keywords such as “scan”, and
“protection”. Cluster-2 had 35 apps having keywords in the
likes of “cleaner” and “boost”. These apps are mainly tools
that facilitate removing unwanted files and cleaning up mem-
ory with extra features for security and virus detection. We
highlight the main keywords in the two clusters in Figure 5.
IV. PRIVACY POLICY ANALYSIS
As mentioned earlier in the introduction, smartphone users
place an enormous amount of trust on the developers of
security apps by entrusting them with their most personal
TABLE I: Analysis summary of privacy policies
Type of data Use of data Data shared with third-parties
Attribute No. of Apps Attribute No. of Apps Attribute No. of Apps
Personal information 71 Newsletter 53 Legal authorities 55
User behavior 62 Service improvement 77 Business affiliates 48
Hardware information 75 Security services 48 Business partners 55
Upload files to cloud 30 Re-sellers 21
Others 30
data. Thus, it is important to understand whether there are
any additional uses of data and resources accessible to security
apps apart from the sole purpose of keeping user devices safe.
Therefore, we next investigate the contents and the terms of the
privacy policies of the 100 selected security apps. Surprisingly,
five apps didn’t have any privacy policy. The most notable was
“See Who Is Tracking You”, an app that allows the users to
keep track of other apps collecting their location information
in background. Currently over 500,000 users have installed
this app without realising that there is no privacy policy.
We visited the ULRs of the privacy policies defined in the
home pages of the apps and collected a copy of their privacy
policies. Next, we read the privacy policies ourselves searching
answers for three high level questions:
i) What type of data the security apps collect? Since secu-
rity apps have access to highly sensitive private data, it is
important to understand whether they actually collect such
data. Users have the right to know what data is collected
and usually this information is hidden in the fine-print
of the privacy policies. We could categorise the such
data collections into four high level categories; personal
information (e.g. personally identifiable information such
as name, email, and persistent identifiers), user behaviour
(e.g. how the app is used or other apps’ usage data),
hardware information (e.g. device model and brand), and
file upload (e.g. obtaining copies of stored data).
ii) What are the intended uses of collected data? - Usually
apps collect data for legitimate purposes such as mea-
suring user experience, identifying bugs, or identifying
feature requirements. While such data collections are un-
derstandable, many privacy regulations stipulate that app
developers must clearly explain how the collected data is
used. Thus, it is important to understand whether security
apps comply to such legal requirements. We categorised
the uses of data into three; newsletter (e.g. registering
users into the developers mailing lists to receive infor-
mation and promotional material), service improvements
(e.g. identifying bugs), and security services (e.g. the core
services provided by the app such as virus scanning)
iii) Is the data being shared with third parties? If yes,
who are the third parties with such access - In some
occasions mobile app developers may share the data they
collect with third parties. It is necessary for security app
users to understand whether this is happening to their data
and under what circumstances. It is equally important to
understand who the above third parties are. For example,
data can be shared offline in a business-to-business man-
ner with analytics companies. Also, data can be shared
online through embedded third-party advertisement and
analytics libraries. Finally, data can be also shared on-
demand with bodies such as law enforcement. We cate-
gorise such third parties into four; legal authorities (e.g.
law enforcement requesting user data), business affiliates,
business partners, and re-sellers (various business part-
ners of the app developer). We also find occasions where
the associated third party information is unclear. Such
cases were categorised into other.
We adhered to manual reading than automated analysis
because usually the privacy policies are complex legal doc-
uments with low readability scores [23] and as of now there
is no automated tool that can be readily used. We tested the
tool Polisis [13],2 nonetheless it was not able to conclusively
provide reliable answers to the questions we were after.
In Table I we summarise our findings and the detailed
analysis of each app policy with references to the paragraphs
and the sections of privacy policies is available online.3 We
recommend interested readers to go through the table provided
in the link for further information on app policies. We found
that 55 apps may share the data with legal authorities if
required and almost all the apps had some form of data sharing
with their business partners. Around 70 apps were found to
be collecting personal information and hardware information.
V. PERMISSION ANALYSIS
We next analyse the permission usage of the selected apps.
In Android operating system apps can only access phone
resources be it hardware or data, only after declaring their
intentions as permission requests in the Android manifest
XML file associated with the app. According to Android
documentation [1] there are three permission categories; nor-
mal permissions, dangerous permissions, and signature per-
missions. The normal permissions though they have to be
declared by the app developer in the Android manifest file, do
not require user’s explicit consent before accessing the data or
the resource. Examples for normal permissions include access
to the Internet, WiFi state, and detecting phone reboots. In
contrast, dangerous permissions require user’s explicit consent
before accessing the data and hence pop up a dialog window to
request access when the app needs that permission for the very
first time. Examples for dangerous permissions include access
to contacts, storage, or location. Finally, signature permissions
are a special type of permissions that is granted at installation
time only if the app that attempts to use a permission is
2https://pribot.org/polisis
3https://tinyurl.com/ya8rhxgz
signed by the same certificate as the app that defines the
permission. Signature permissions are usually used when a
single developer developing a suite of apps.
The permissions requested by an app usually can give
an understanding of the features of the app as well as
any associated privacy and security risks. In order to check
the permission requests, we decompiled each Android APK
executable and extracted the AndroidManifest.XML. By
parsing the Manifest file we extracted the permission requests
defined by each app. We observed that, on average a security
app requested 22.09 permissions. Out of that average number
of normal permissions was 12.23, followed by 5.52 signa-
ture permissions and 4.33 dangerous permissions. ‘McAfee
Security” requested the highest number of permissions by an
app, which was 51. In Figure 6, we show the cumulative
distribution of different apps. We notice that approximately
60% of the apps requested five dangerous permissions.
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Fig. 6: Cumulative distribution function of number of permis-
sions
A. Normal Permissions
We observe 149 different normal permissions were
requested by the security apps. In Figure 7 we
show the 10 most frequently requested permissions.
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED is the most frequently
sought permission which is understandable given that security
apps needs to continuously run in the background across
device reboots. Other frequently requested normal permissions
are predominantly related to the internet access.
B. Dangerous Permissions
We found that 35 different dangerous permissions were
requested by the selected 100 security apps. Top-10 fre-
quently requested permissions are shown in Figure 8. As
can be seen from the figure, the two most frequently
requested permissions were WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
and READ_EXTERNAL_ STORAGE. The purpose of these
two permissions is to read and write from external storage
such as SD cards. More often than not, mobile users store
personal information and data such as photos, documents,
videos on external storage. Thus, despite the legitimate uses
of these permissions in the likes of scanning for viruses or
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Fig. 7: Top 10 Normal Permissions.
deleting malware and unused files, a bad actor can abuse this
permission to steal personal information.
Similarly, another frequently asked permission
READ_PHONE_STATE enables security features such
as call blocking or blacklisting. However, granting this
permission will also allow access to read the phone number
or interrupt legitimate calls. In the privacy policy analysis we
found that some applications collect the users phone number
and they may use it for advertising and even share with third
parties. Such information at wrong hands can cause major
damages to the user such as identity theft.
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Fig. 8: Top 10 Dangerous Permissions
To summarise, the majority of the requested dangerous
permissions have an associated legitimate security feature
included in the security app. However, in our privacy policy
analysis we found evidence the collected data may have other
uses and can be shared with third parties. As such, the security
app users need to be cautious when granting such permissions
and need to carefully evaluate the trade-offs between the
feature and the potential privacy threats.
VI. MALWARE DETECTION
We next evaluate how effective are these security apps in
detecting known Android malware. We selected six malware
samples that have been detected and publicly disclosed be-
tween 2015 and 2019. All sample malware are sourced from
TABLE II: The description of Six Selected Malware/Virus
Malware
Name
Release Year Makeup Malicious Behavior
Trojan 2017 Fake Adobe Flash Player
update the web page
1. Once installed, it pops up a dialogue box requesting a device information from a user.
2. If a user grants access to device information then this malware contacts command and
control (C&C) server and sends device information for possible exploitation.
Backdoor 2015 BeNews app (Already re-
moved from the Google
Play Store)
1. This malware successfully bypasses the security verification check from the Google
Play Store and has been downloaded over fifty times by the device users before it is
removed from the store.
2. The malware works by opening the backdoor for hackers to remotely control the victim’s
device and installing different types of malware(s) on a device, once a user clicks the app.
Spyware 2016 Banker Trojan (app name
is various time to time)
1. Once installed on a mobile device, this malware hides its icon (in a stealth mode) and
keeps sending the device information to the C&C server.
2. This malware type also tricks user to enter or update their credit card details into a
fake Google Play web page.
Banking mal-
ware
2016 Sberbank (a reputable
Russian bank online app)
1. This malware attempts to perform a phishing attack on a user by creating an app logo
that looks similar to the banking apps icon. Hence, it misleads a user to download the app
and steals his credentials.
2. The malware is also capable of intercepting SMS messages and incoming calls on a
mobile device.
Banking mal-
ware (new)
2019 BatterySaverMobi 1. This malware was downloaded over one thousands times with dozens of fake five-star
ratings at the Google Play Store.
2. The malware gets a device administrator privileges by luring users to install a fake
system update.
3. It collects users banking information through inbuilt keylogger module and screenshots,
and is much flexible in hiding itself than other similar Trojans.
Xbot 2016 Fake Google Plays pay-
ment interface
1. This malware imitates Google Play Store payment interface alongwith the login pages
of seven banks to steal banking credentials and credit card information.
2. The malware is also capable of control infected devices remotely.
3. It also encrypts victim’s files and ask for the ransom to decrypt them.
GitHub, and the general description of each selected malware
is shown in Table II.
Using these malware we tested two scenarios; i) whether the
security apps can detect a copy of malware stored in a phone
and ii) whether the security apps can detect malware installed
in the phone. We installed the selected security apps one by
one in a Google Pixel phone and assessed its performance
with respect to these two tasks. We highlight that we could
test only 86 out of the 100 apps we selected because 14 of
them were limited to Samsung phones only.
We show the results in Figure 9. Surprisingly, detection
rate of disk copies were quite low. For each malware sample,
only 15-20 of the security apps could detect them even after
running a full system scan (when such a feature is available).
Malicious file detection can be considered as the first line of
defence when it comes to defending smartphones and lack
of that indicates a serious functional limitation in commercial
security apps.
The detection rates installed malware was high compared
to disk copies, yet not perfect. Between 40-50 security apps
out of 86, were able to identify installed malware except for
the case of the banking malware. The detection rate of the
banking malware for both on disk file and installed file was
much lower than the others. The main reason for this may be
the fact that this malware was released in 2019 whereas the
others are a few years older. Nonetheless, it is an eye-opening
result that 20-30 so called security apps fail to identify actual
malware installed in a smartphone and also show much lower
detection rates when it comes to more recent, yet publicly
known malware. This gives a false sense of security to the
users who are under the impression that their devices are safe
due to the presence of a security app.
Further to this, as shown in Table III, 30 apps were not
able to detect any of the installed malware and 12 detected
only 1-3 malware samples. Only 32 were able to detect all
six samples of installed malware. Example apps that did not
identify app six malware samples includes “SandBlast Mobile
Protect” and “Free Spyware Removal Info”, while apps such as
“Norton”, “McAfee”, “Kaspersky”, and “Safe Security” were
able to identify all six samples of the malware. We highlight
that one factor behind lower detection rates is that there are
some apps that provide different security features than virus
and spyware scanning.
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Fig. 9: Detection rates of various malware types
VII. NETWORK TRAFFIC
Since the majority of the security app we investigated (95
out of 100), it is possible these apps might monetise user data
through advertising and analytics. We already reported such
TABLE III: Detection of installed malware
No. of detected malware No. of detecting security apps
0 30
1 - 3 12
4 - 5 11
6 32
evidence during our privacy policy analysis (cf. Section IV).
To investigate further on this, we used the Lumen privacy
monitor [32] which can continuously monitor all installed
applications’ operations and record all traffic flows of each
application separately. Lumen also can identify when personal
information is leaked by a particular application.
To monitor all the traffic flows from each application, we
installed applications one by one and set the monitor time to
six hours. We granted all the permissions requested by the
app so that it is fully functional. Next we extracted Lumen’s
dataset for further analysis.
A. Packet Destinations: IPs, Ports, and Domains
In Figure 10 we show the number of packets send by
each app during the six hour observation period to different
destination ports (top-10 according to number of packets as
well as all apps). 360 Security is the app that sent out the
highest number of packets. Majority of the apps sent encrypted
packets to port 443 with the exception of APUS Security,
which had a significant fraction of non-encrypted traffic going
into port 80. Other apps with noticeable unencrypted traffic
included 360 Security, Security Master, Virus Cleaner, and
Super Cleaner.
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Fig. 10: Distribution of Packets Sent by Apps
Next, in Figure 11 we show the top-10 apps according to the
number of unique IP addresses they contact. 360 Security was
again at the top with contacting over 180 unique IP addresses
accounting for over 100 domains. In summary, there were nine
apps that contacted over 100 IPs and three apps that contacted
over 50 domain names.
Most frequent domains that are being contacted by 360
Security are visualised in Figure 12. While the majority
of the traffic has gone to cloud service providers such as
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Amazon, Google, DigitalOcean, and Rackspace, we also see
the advertising company Mopub’s domain name among the
domains indicating possible advertising or analytics activities.
Fig. 12: Top domain names contacted by the app 360 Security
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B. Personal Information Leakage
Finally, we investigate what type of personal information
are being collected by the security apps according to the
Lumen report. Figure 13 summarises the findings. The top
three frequently collected information are device model, build
id, and device brand. Such types of information are potentially
collected for record keeping (e.g. a virus was found only
in certain brands of phones). Nonetheless, we also found a
limited number of apps that collect more personal information
in nature such as list of installed apps and personally identi-
fiable information such as the Android serial, Android ID,
and BSSID. While such information collection can still have
legitimate uses in the context of device security, leaving such
information in the hands of third-parties can pose significant
privacy threats to the users [39][40].
All in all, it is surprising to see multiple security apps still
not using fully encrypted connections. Also, it is questionable
whether all of these network connections are essential for the
core features of the app. Finally, we found evidence of security
apps indeed collecting and transmitting personal information
to their back-end servers and users need to be wary of this,
given our findings on privacy policies.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we presented the first multi-faceted study of
Android security apps. We next discuss the implications of our
findings, limitations, and possible extensions.
Providing a false sense of security - One of our key findings
was that a significant fraction of Android security apps provide
a false sense of security. Around 75% of the apps failed to
identify malware copied into the phone storage. While the
detection rates were better when it comes to installed malware
(∼50%), they were not ideal. Also, we noted that detection
rates drops further when it comes to very recent malware.
Therefore, the users must not by any means consider their
devices secure due to the mere fact that they have installed an
Android security app. They must read the product reviews
and understand the features provided by these apps. Most
importantly, users must understand apps’ limitations as well
as the features not provided by these apps.
Not following best software development practices - We
also found evidence of developers not following best software
development practices. For example, multiple apps were gen-
erating significant volumes of unencrypted traffic and there
were a few apps without privacy policies. Also, as highlighted
earlier some virus databases are not updated frequently. While
both Google and Apple takes active measures [34][19] to
control fraudulent security apps, it appears that much stricter
checks are required.
Personal information collection and usage - Through per-
mission analysis we demonstrated that the security apps have
access to vast amount of personal data. Our privacy policy
analysis showed that the majority of the security apps do
indeed collect personal information and we found empirical
evidence of such data collections in network traces as well.
The users must be wary of these data collections and must
carefully assess the trade-offs between the security features
they require and the possible personal data leakage. It is
important to read the fine-print of the privacy policies and
understand how the collected data is used. Finally, to assist
the end users in making their decisions, we believe it is a
good practice for the app developers to publish descriptions
of the uses of various permission requests.
Limitations and future work - Our analysis can be further ex-
tended in multiple ways. For example, further analysis can be
conducted to trace what data is going to what domains by using
an SSL proxy. That will allow to further segregate and decide
whether the data is collected for the core features of the app or
for advertising purposes. Also, privacy policies can be studied
together with actual data collections, along side with privacy
law experts and investigate whether the apps comply the
applicable privacy laws and regulations. Permission analysis
can be further expanded by decompiling the codes and analyse
the actual API calls that are being called. This will allow to
obtain a much fine-granular understanding of apps behaviours.
In this work, we investigated only the effectiveness of the
security apps in detecting malware. However, among the apps
we investigated, there were apps that did not claim to provide
malware scanning features, but other security features. Thus,
further analysis can be done to investigate the performance of
the security apps with respect to their specific features.
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